Introduction
This paper investigates the importance of uninsured idiosyncratic production risk by the firm owned by the entrepreneur, and the importance of borrowing constraints for aggregate capital accumulation. It is interesting to analyze the implications of incomplete markets in this setting, for the following reasons. First, the volatility of entrepreneurial earnings is substantially larger than that of wages from paid employment (Hamilton 2000) . Second, the portfolio of entrepreneurial households is biased towards their business (Gentry and Hubbard 2004) , which makes their equity return highly correlated with their human capital return (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002) . One of the contributions of this study is to analyze the implications of the lack of diversification in entrepreneurs' earnings for aggregate capital accumulation. This paper shows that, when borrowing constraints exist, and in the presence of uninsurable investment risks, the most likely general-equilibrium outcome is a higher steady-state level of capital both in the private and corporate sectors in a heterogeneous agents economy. The driving force of this inefficiency is the interaction between credit market imperfections and uninsurable production risks, which generate strong precautionary savings for entrepreneurs. Because entrepreneurs accumulate a buffer stock of wealth and are relatively wealthy households, they also exert a large influence on the accumulation of capital in the corporate sector. Understanding this mechanism may be useful for analyzing important issues in macroeconomics, particularly the implications of incomplete markets for asset pricing and business cycles.
This study uses a general-equilibrium model of entrepreneurial investment in which agents are subject to uninsurable production risk and borrowing constraints. In the model, a large number of entrepreneurs are able to pursue different investment portfolio choices. In particular, entrepreneurial wealth is allocated between a risky and a safe investment. The return on the risky investment is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The return on the safe investment is the equilibrium interest rate. I introduce borrowing constraints as a short-sales constraint on the safe investment. Also, the only source of non-stochastic earnings is the return on the safe investment.
In the presence of uninsurable production risk, risk-averse entrepreneurs prefer an investment portfolio biased towards the safe investment. More specifically, in the absence of binding borrowing constraints and when the return on the safe investment is not affected by the entrepreneurs' investment decisions, there is underaccumulation of capital in the risky investment. In general equilibrium, however, precautionary savings by all entrepreneurs increase the demand for the safe investment, which lowers its equilibrium return. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of the risky investment relative to the safe investment, and weakens the underaccumulation result.
Borrowing constraints play an important role in the model: they make it more difficult for the entrepreneur to smooth consumption, which increases the desire to save more in general (precautionary savings). An increase in demand for the safe asset leads to a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate, because the safe asset is in zero net supply. Consequently, the risky investment becomes even more attractive and, in equilibrium, if the precautionary savings effect is strong enough, entrepreneurs accumulate excess capital in the steady state.
I obtain this result by first analyzing the case where all agents are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk and borrowing constraints. In almost all cases considered, these two frictions yield a higher steady-state level of entrepreneurial capital than in the complete markets case. In particular, the increase in the steady-state level of entrepreneurial capital ranges between −1 and 50 per cent, depending on the parameterizations of the model. However, although the results suggest that the overaccumulation of investment capital is the most likely general-equilibrium outcome, such an outcome depends on some of my assumptions.
For example, increasing the entrepreneurs' level of diversification by introducing other non-stochastic sources of income reduces the general-equilibrium effect, which weakens the overaccumulation of capital. Changing the specification of entrepreneurial risk by assuming a stochastic depreciation rate of capital, instead of production risk, also weakens the general-equilibrium effect. I extend the model to include non-entrepreneurial agents who supply labour to the non-entrepreneurial (corporate) sector, and are subject to uninsurable labour income risk. These extensions are interesting for two reasons: (i) the zero net-supply assumption on the safe investment is relaxed, and (ii) they allow a comparison between my results and those in standard Bewley (1977) models with uninsurable labour income risk (e.g., Aiyagari 1994) . In this environment, I predict an overaccumulation of capital in the entrepreneurial sector by 25 per cent in an economy that is able to replicate the wealth concentration in the U.S. economy. I also find an overaccumulation of capital in the corporate sector of 35 per cent. This is considerably higher than the 11 per cent that comes out from a standard Bewley (1977) This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the entrepreneurial economy model in which all agents are subject to uninsurable production risk, and it derives the equilibrium conditions that are obtained from the individual decision problem. Section 3 introduces functional forms and the benchmark parameterization.
Section 4 analyzes the deviation between the capital stock in the economy with frictions and the capital stock that would be chosen in an economy without production risk. Section 5 analyzes the overall efficiency of capital accumulation in an economy that is able to replicate the wealth concentration observed in the data. Finally, section 6 offers some conclusions.
Entrepreneurial Economy
This section introduces the benchmark economy. Consider an economy with a measure one of infinitely lived entrepreneurial households. Each household has the ability to operate its own technology. This technology represents the risky investment of the agent, because it is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The model presented in this section is similar to the one used in Angeletos (2005) , with three important exceptions: (i) entrepreneurs face occasionally binding borrowing constraints and, as in Aiyagari (1994) , entrepreneurial wealth heterogeneity plays an important role in determining equilibrium prices; (ii) the return on a safe investment is the only source of non-stochastic earnings; and (iii) the idiosyncratic production process can exhibit positive serial correlation. 
Environment
For simplicity, there is only one consumption good. The utility function of each entrepreneur, U (·), is strictly increasing, strictly concave, obeys the Inada conditions, and is twice continuously differentiable in consumption, c t . Since there are idiosyncratic shocks, c t will differ across agents. To simplify the notation, I do not index the variables to indicate this cross-sectional variation. The entrepreneur's problem is to maximize the expected lifetime utility derived from consumption:
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
Each period, the entrepreneur can invest both in the individual-specific technology, which represents the risky investment, and also in a safe investment that yields a sure return. In addition, the entrepreneur is allowed to borrow to finance both consumption and the risky investment; that is, the entrepreneur may choose to invest a negative amount of funds in the safe investment. Borrowing is constrained for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection not explicitly modelled, and the limit is fixed exogenously for simplicity. The risky technology available to the entrepreneur is represented by
where z t denotes productivity and k t is the capital stock in the risky investment. This investment is risky because the stock of capital, k t , is chosen one period in advance; that is, before observing the level of productivity, z t .
The idiosyncratic productivity process, z t , follows a first-order Markov process. Further, assume that f (·)
is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave with f (0) = 0, and satisfying the Inada conditions. Also, capital depreciates at a fixed rate, δ, and the gross risky investment is given by
Let b t+1 denote the resources of the entrepreneur allocated to the safe investment. This investment pays a sure return, r, in each period. This rate of return is determined in equilibrium such that the bond market clears in each period. In this environment, the entrepreneur's budget constraint is as follows:
where x t denotes the entrepreneur's period t wealth.
Let v(z, x) be the optimal value function for an entrepreneur with productivity z and wealth x. 3 The entrepreneur's optimization problem can be specified in terms of the following dynamic programming problem:
where b represents the exogenous borrowing constraint faced by the entrepreneur. From the properties of the utility and production functions of the entrepreneur, the optimal levels of consumption and the risky investment are always strictly positive. The only constraint that may be binding is the choice of b . Taking first-order conditions of problem (6) and using the envelope condition, the first-order conditions of the problem are as follows:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the entrepreneur's borrowing constraint, b b. The Lagrange multiplier is positive if the constraint is binding, and zero otherwise. Definition 1 summarizes the steady-state equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 1
The steady-state equilibrium in this economy is: a value function for the entrepreneur, v(z, x); the policy functions of the entrepreneur {k(z, x), b(z, x), c(z, x)}; a value for the interest rate, r; and a probability measure of entrepreneurs, Γ(z, x), such that:
(i) Given r, the entrepreneur's policy functions solve the entrepreneur's decision problem (6).
(ii) Entrepreneurial capital and bonds are given by:
where all integrals are defined over the state space Z × X .
(iii) The bond market clears:
(iv) Given the policy functions of the entrepreneur, the probability measure of entrepreneurs, Γ(z, x), is invariant.
Parameterization
The properties of the model can be evaluated only numerically. Therefore, I need to assign functional forms and parameter values to find the numerical solution of the model. The period is one year, and so the discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.96. For the utility function, a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) specification is assumed: where γ is the risk-aversion parameter. In the benchmark model, this parameter is chosen to be 2. The entrepreneur's risky technology is given by k α , with the curvature parameter, α, equal to 0.36. The depreciation rate, δ, equals 0.08. The idiosyncratic productivity process is first-order Markov:
where ∼ N (0, 1); the serial correlation parameter, ρ z , is set at 0.90; and the unconditional standard deviation of productivity, σ z , is set at 0.4. The specification presented in (13) is convenient; in section 4, I will show the sensitivity of the model's steady state to changes in the level of serial correlation of productivity risk, keeping the unconditional standard deviation constant. As part of the numerical algorithm, I use the procedure suggested by Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to approximate the first-order autoregressive process with a discretestate stochastic process that has seven states. 4 I set the exogenous borrowing constraint at b = −4, which corresponds to roughly twice the net income generated by the average entrepreneur in one year.
5 Table 1 summarizes the parameter values adopted in the benchmark entrepreneurial model.
Capital Accumulation in the Entrepreneurial Economy
In this section, I analyze the deviation between the capital stock in the economy with frictions and the capital stock that would be chosen in an economy without production risk. Although the model is a general-equilibrium model, I will consider a simple partial-equilibrium version to gain intuition regarding the importance of the different aspects of the model.
Numerical solution
The solution method used to solve the dynamic programming problem works directly on the first-order conditions of the problem, defined in equations (7) and (8). The appendix describes the numerical procedures used to find the solution to the entrepreneur's problem. Table 1 provides details concerning the discretization of the state space. Figure 1 plots the entrepreneur's decision rules for consumption, the risky and safe investments, and the safe-to-risky investment ratio. The decision rules are a function of the two state variables of the model: wealth and the idiosyncratic productivity shock. For clarity, the figure describes only the policy rules for three different levels of idiosyncratic productivity: the lower and the upper bound, and the mean value. The two top plots depict the entrepreneur's investment-portfolio decision rules for the risky and safe investments. Poor entrepreneurs 4 The results are robust to finer discretizations; namely, I solved the model with 15 and 21 states for the exogenous stochastic process and found minor changes in the results.
5 Huggett (1993) suggests that a credit limit of one year's average endowment is a reasonable one. I loosen up his suggestion by one year. In the data, however, individuals can often borrow much more than that. For this reason, in section 4.3.1, I show the robustness of the results to this assumption. 
Consumption
Wealth invest all their wealth in the risky investment and are at the short-sales constraint in the safe investment. As wealth levels increase, investment shifts towards the safe investment, but the rate at which entrepreneurs do so depends on their productivity level.
The mechanism
The uninsurable production risk and borrowing constraints give rise to two opposing effects on capital accumulation. First, an increase in the amount of production risk means that the investment itself becomes more risky, which implies that the agents would like to invest less in the risky investment. Second, an increase in the amount of production risk also means that it becomes harder to smooth consumption, which implies that the agents would like to save more in general (precautionary savings). Since the agents can also invest in a safe asset, one might think that in this economy they would respond to an increase in production risk by substituting out of the risky investment and into the safe asset. In general equilibrium, however, this is not possible, since the safe asset is in zero net supply. Consequently, the increased demand for the safe asset leads to a decrease in the interest rate. This, in turn, makes the risky asset more attractive. If the precautionary savings motive is very strong, then the interest rate would decrease considerably and the investment in the risky asset might very well increase. To understand the quantitative importance of the different channels, I solve a partial-equilibrium version of the model, in which the interest rate is set equal to a value just below 1/β − 1. Note that 1/β − 1 corresponds to the interest rate under the assumption of complete markets.
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The left panel in Figure 2 plots the aggregate level of capital allocated to the risky technology, the safe investment, and aggregate consumption as a function of the standard deviation of production risk, σ z . 7 First, the aggregate level of capital is below the complete markets case and declines as production risk increases. The underaccumulation of capital provides a measure of the importance of uninsurable production risk. Second, the supply of the safe investment is above zero (the equilibrium value) and increases sharply with increases in the amount of production risk.
Because the aggregate supply of the safe investment is greater than zero, the outcomes described above are not an equilibrium. To generate an equilibrium, the price of the safe investment must go up; that is, the interest rate must adjust downwards. The large drop in the interest rate that is needed to get back to equilibrium indicates that the precautionary motive is very strong for this model. The right panel in Figure 2 plots the equilibrium response of capital, interest rates, and consumption as a function of the standard deviation of productivity risk. For the specification of productivity risk used here, the price of the safe investment must go up significantly to generate equilibrium in the bond market. Consequently, the lower return on the safe investment increases the attractiveness of the risky investment, resulting in a higher steady-state level of entrepreneurial 6 Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) show that, with r = 1/β − 1, consumption can grow without bound as t goes to infinity. I set r equal to 0.04166, whereas r = 1/β − 1 is equal to 0.041667.
7 For simplicity, I assume that the process is serially uncorrelated. capital, despite the presence of uninsurable production risk.
Sensitivity analysis
I repeat this exercise for different parameterizations to verify the robustness of the results. I find that, for the specification of production risk considered here,
8 the results are robust, except for low values of the coefficient of risk aversion. Moreover, I find that the amount of overaccumulation of capital increases when the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases, the persistence of productivity risk increases, and the maximum amount by which agents can go short in the safe asset decreases.
Borrowing constraints
Figure 3 plots the sensitivity of aggregate capital stock to changes in the short-sales constraint of the safe investment. The figure shows that tighter short-sales constraints exacerbate the overaccumulation result. This is not surprising, because under more restrictive borrowing constraints it is more difficult for entrepreneurs to smooth consumption in the presence of adverse shocks to productivity. Hence, entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive to self-insure and respond by increasing their demand for the safe investment. This, in turn, generates an even stronger response of the equilibrium interest rate, resulting in a higher steady-state level of entrepreneurial capital.
In addition, Figure 3 shows that the economy displays overaccumulation even with very loose borrowing constraints. For example, even when the credit limit is equivalent to four times the net income of the entrepreneur, there is still some overaccumulation. Hence, I do not need to resort to unreasonably tight borrowing constraints to generate a higher steady-state level of capital relative to the complete markets case. Even with the "natural" borrowing limit, the economy displays overaccumulation of capital of 0.15 per cent when σ z = 0.40. 9 In this model, the "natural" borrowing constraint is given by
where z 1 = min z and k 1 = (
) 1/(α−1) . In particular, for σz = 0.40 the "natural" borrowing limit is b ≈ −11.9. the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher than the capital share, then that is a sufficient condition to give rise to underaccumulation of capital. Under CRRA preferences, this condition is equivalent to stating that the solution displays underaccumulation when 1 γ > α. Table 2 shows that, in the presence of borrowing constraints and when the entrepreneur cannot supply labour to a competitive labour market, I get overaccumulation even in cases where 1 γ > α. For example, with b = −2, the solution displays underaccumulation when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 0.5. When γ = 1, and according to Angeletos' (2005) sufficient condition, the solution should display underaccumulation for α ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}; however, the solution always displays overaccumulation for these values of α. When b = −4 and γ = 1, the solution displays overaccumulation for α ∈ {0.5, 0.7}, and for b = −8 it displays overaccumulation only for α = 0.7. These results suggest that loosening the credit limit increases the number of examples where there is underaccumulation. Still, the experiment with the "natural" borrowing limit reported in Table 2 suggests that borrowing constraints are not sufficient to explain the overturning of the underaccumulation of capital reported by Angeletos (2005) .
Otherwise, the economy would display underaccumulation of capital at the "natural" borrowing constraint.
There is another important feature of the model, which is the fact that entrepreneurs cannot supply labour in a competitive labour market. Under this assumption, entrepreneurial income is relatively more concentrated in the entrepreneurial risky investment. The presence of occasionally binding borrowing constraints and the lack of income diversification of the entrepreneur give powerful incentives to entrepreneurs to increase savings for consumption-smoothing (self-insurance) reasons, which further depresses the interest rate and increases the accumulation of capital. Empirical evidence suggests that "the average entrepreneur holds most of his investment in the same private firm in which he works, making his equity return highly correlated with his human capital return" (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002, 746) ; hence, the case where the entrepreneur is poorly diversified is highly relevant to this study.
More generally, these results are qualitatively consistent with the intuition provided by Angeletos (2005) . In particular, α and γ are also important parameters in my environment, and the qualitative effect of changing these two parameters is as in Angeletos (2005) . I introduce other important dimensions that should be taken into account in these studies. Namely, under the presence of occasionally binding borrowing constraints, it is important to also consider the level of diversification of the entrepreneur. Finally, note that these results consider only the case where productivity is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Relaxing this assumption increases the number of cases where the solution displays overaccumulation, as I show in section 4.3.3. Given all these dimensions in which results may change, it is more difficult to find a sufficient condition relevant to the assumptions advanced in this study.
Persistence in productivity
This section analyzes the sensitivity of the model's solution to changes in the serial correlation of the risky technology. Figure 5 plots the difference between the aggregate capital stock under incomplete and complete markets, for different levels of serial correlation in productivity. Focusing on the case with σ z = 0.4, I find that, as persistence is increased, the equilibrium interest rate drops considerably. In particular, when there is no serial correlation, the interest rate is equal to 3.5 per cent, whereas it is equal to 1.2 per cent in the case with ρ = 0.9 (Table 3) . Not surprisingly, the large drop in the interest rate when the amount of persistence increases leads to a large increase in risky capital. In particular, when ρ = 0.9, the aggregate level of capital stock is 24 per cent higher than would be observed under complete markets. Note that investment is not irreversible, and so an increase in persistence does not increase the risk of the return on the risky investment. Persistence in the productivity process does mean, however, that if bad times occur they last longer, which increases the importance of the precautionary savings motive. Table 3 also reports the Gini coefficient of wealth. Interestingly, there is an increase in wealth dispersion in the economy, even for very high levels of persistence. This contradicts the findings of Krusell and Smith (1997);  in their environment, very high degrees of persistence tend to reduce wealth dispersion. The fact that agents can operate their own technology and the presence of borrowing constraints are key to generating this result: they induce a strong precautionary savings motive. This implies that the increase in the Gini index is being driven by the agents at the upper tail of the wealth distribution. The intuition is that, following an increase in persistence: (i) poorer agents increase the amount borrowed, and more agents exhibit binding borrowing constraints, and (ii) in response to the increase in the interest rate, rich agents do not invest as much in capital. Table 4 compares, for different values of z, the average capital stock observed in this economy for agents that receive a productivity shock equal to z, and the aggregate capital stock in an economy with complete markets in which z would represent the aggregate productivity shock.
10 Consistent with Figure 5 , Table 4 shows that the average overaccumulation of capital is much smaller when there is less persistence. When there is no serial correlation, agents in the complete markets economy choose a constant capital stock. In contrast, in the economy with incomplete markets, agents choose a lower capital stock when productivity is low, to smooth 
Depreciation risk
I showed in section 4.3 that the overaccumulation of entrepreneurial capital, in the presence of uninsurable production risk, is robust to most changes in the parameters considered. In this section, I investigate whether the result is robust to a change in the specification of entrepreneurial risk. An important alternative considered in the literature is the specification for which the amount of depreciation is stochastic. Moreover, this alternative has been shown to be helpful in explaining the equity premium puzzle (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2001) .
In particular, assume that the depreciation rate follows the law of motion given by:
where η t ∼ N (0, σ 2 η ). To ensure that the condition δ t ∈ (0, 1] is not violated in the numerical example, η t is discretized into seven grid points and the value of s is set equal to 0.08.
11 In the recursive formulation given in equation (6), the entrepreneur's resources become Because output is not subject to shocks, the entrepreneur's flow of income is approximately constant. Only the stock of capital changes, owing to depreciation risk, but this generates a small precautionary savings effect.
Consequently, the reduction in the interest rate that is needed to keep the bond market in equilibrium is small, and the steady-state level of capital is lower than the level observed in complete markets.
I next analyze the results when production and depreciation risk are both present. For simplicity, I focus on two special cases. In the first case, the two shocks are positively correlated; namely, periods of high productivity are accompanied by high depreciation. In particular, I set s > 0 and η = ln(z). In the second case, I assume that the two shocks are negatively correlated; that is, periods of high productivity coincide with periods of low depreciation. In particular, I assume that η = ln(z) and change the sign of s (so that s < 0), but keep the absolute value of s unchanged.
Figure 7 plots aggregate entrepreneurial capital and aggregate bonds as a function of the standard deviation of production and depreciation risk. With negative correlated shocks, the uninsurable risk effect is quite strong. This is not surprising, because periods of low productivity are accompanied by a large write-off, which exacerbates the risk associated with the investment in entrepreneurial capital. In fact, for lower levels of production risk, the uninsurable risk and the precautionary savings effect roughly offset each other, and there is no under-or overaccumulation of entrepreneurial capital. The effects are clearly non-linear in the amount of production risk, however, and when the standard deviation of productivity and depreciation risks exceeds 0.4, the model generates overaccumulation of capital. In the case where the two shocks are positively correlated, the uninsurable risk effect is clearly dominated by the precautionary savings effect. There is some diversification, because periods of low production are "compensated" with a lower depreciation rate. Under the positive correlation assumption, the risky investment is a relatively attractive asset with which to accumulate wealth and smooth consumption over time.
Extension to a Stylized Entrepreneurial Economy
In the previous section, I analyzed the effect of production risk on entrepreneurial capital in an economy that consisted only of entrepreneurs. I showed that the quantitative effect clearly depended on the level of the interest rate needed to keep entrepreneurs' aggregate demand for bonds equal to zero. The question arises as to how the results would change if entrepreneurs' aggregate demand for bonds could be non-zero; for example, because there are other types of agents in the economy. In this section, I modify the environment introduced in section 2 as follows: (i) a fixed fraction of agents do not have access to the risky technology (workers); (ii) a corporate sector replaces the investment in bonds as the safe investment; and (iii) workers face uninsurable wage risk, as in Aiyagari (1994) . Several key parameters are chosen, so that the concentration of wealth generated by the model corresponds to the one observed in the data. 
Environment
Assume that only a fixed fraction of agents has access to the risky technology. The agents that do not have access to this technology are denoted by workers in the model. These agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth holdings and earnings ability. They choose consumption to maximize their expected lifetime utility:
subject to the following budget constraint:
wherec t denotes the worker's consumption in period t, a t denotes the worker's savings in period t, w is the worker's wage rate, and l t represents a labour-efficiency process. I assume that workers are also subject to a borrowing constraint; that is, a t+1 a, where a 0.
Letṽ(l, a) be the optimal value function for a worker with labour efficiency, l, and savings, a. The worker's optimization problem can be specified in terms of the following dynamic programming problem:
a a.
The stochastic process for the labour-efficiency process is first-order autoregressive:
where ε ∼ N (0, 1). The solution to this problem yields the agent's optimal decision rule with respect to consumption,c(l, a), and the next period's asset-demand function, g(l, a). In this economy, the consumption good is produced by two sectors: (i) the entrepreneurial sector and (ii) a corporate sector that uses a constantreturns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, which uses capital and non-entrepreneurial labour as inputs.
The aggregate technology is represented by:
The problem of the entrepreneur is exactly the same as that described in section 2 and will not be discussed here. Note that the safe investment of the entrepreneur corresponds to lending (borrowing) funds to (from) the corporate sector, and the equilibrium interest rate equals the marginal productivity of capital in this sector.
To complete the description of the model, I describe the market-clearing conditions for labour and capital in the new environment. With respect to labour, only the corporate sector technology demands labour input, so the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labour in the corporate sector. With respect to capital, the equilibrium interest rate is also equal to the marginal productivity of capital in equilibrium. The supply of capital to the corporate sector equals non-entrepreneurs' savings in addition to entrepreneurs' portfolio holdings in the safe investment. Definition 2 summarizes the steady-state equilibrium in the extended economy.
Definition 2 The steady-state equilibrium in this economy is: a value function for the entrepreneur, v(z, x), and for the worker,ṽ(l, a); the entrepreneur's policy functions {k(z, x), b(z, x), c(z, x)}; the worker's policy functions {g(l, a),c(l, a)}; a constant cross-sectional distribution of entrepreneurs' characteristics, Γ e (z, x), with mass χ; a constant cross-sectional distribution of workers' characteristics, Γ w (z, x), with mass (1−χ); and factor prices, (r, w), such that:
(ii) Given r, and w, the worker's policy functions solve the worker's decision problem (18).
(iii) Corporate sector capital, corporate sector labour, and entrepreneurial capital are given by:
where the household sector integrals are defined over the state space L × A, and the entrepreneurial sector integrals are defined over the state space Z × X .
(iv) Given K and L, the factor prices are factor marginal productivities:
(v) Given the policy functions of entrepreneurs and workers, the probability measures of entrepreneurs, Γ e , and workers, Γ w , are invariant.
Overaccumulation and the wealth distribution
So far, I have studied capital accumulation in an economy where all agents are subject to uninsurable production risks and the safe investment is in zero net supply. With the introduction of a corporate sector, I analyze the efficiency of capital accumulation in the entrepreneurial and corporate sectors, respectively. For the results, the target is an artificial economy that is able to replicate the wealth concentration in the U.S. economy, as measured by the Gini index reported in Quadrini (2000) . The choice of parameter values is as follows. The fraction of entrepreneurs is set at 10 per cent, following Quadrini (1999) . Both groups have the same preference parameter; that is, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 2. For workers, the law of motion for labour earnings follows the estimates reported in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) ; namely, it is very persistent, with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.95
and an unconditional standard deviation of 0.3. For entrepreneurs, the productivity process is also assumed to be very persistent, with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.95 and a standard deviation of 0.8. Evidence reported by Hamilton (2000) suggests that the standard deviation of self-employment earnings is at least 2 to 4 times larger than wages received from paid employment. This parameterization is consistent with this empirical evidence, but I do not have a direct estimate of the persistence of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. To match the Gini index of wealth observed in the United States, 0.76, the curvature of the entrepreneurial technology, α, is chosen to be 0.45. In addition, the short-sales constraint on bonds is b = −4, which is about the net income of the average entrepreneur for one year. This constraint is not very tight. In equilibrium, only 8 per cent of the entrepreneurial population are borrowing the maximum amount. Finally, the remaining parameters (β, δ,α, a)
are taken from Aiyagari (1994) . Table 5 summarizes the parameter values assumed for this exercise.
Suppose that the fraction of entrepreneurs in this economy is zero; that is, all agents are workers, χ = 0. The equilibrium return on capital is 3.4 per cent. The economy displays an aggregate overaccumulation of capital of 11 per cent. This exercise replicates Aiyagari's result. Next, I assume that 10 per cent of the workers are entrepreneurs. I find an overaccumulation of capital in the entrepreneurial as well as in the corporate sectors.
In this case, the equilibrium interest rate is 2 per cent. The entrepreneurial sector overaccumulates capital by about 25 per cent. The corporate sector overaccumulates capital by 36 per cent.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In this economy, entrepreneurs face large uninsurable risks in production, which induces them to accumulate a buffer stock of wealth. Because entrepreneurs are so wealthy relative to workers, they have a large influence on the accumulation of capital in the corporate sector. Thus, uninsurable production risks introduce sizable distortions in both the entrepreneurial and corporate sectors of the economy. Finally, the results of the model are consistent with empirical evidence found in Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Guvenen (2003) , who argue that uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and incomplete markets are more important for wealthy (i.e., entrepreneurial) households.
Conclusion
I have analyzed a general-equilibrium model of a heterogeneous agents economy with incomplete markets, to understand the size and magnitude of the distortions to entrepreneurial investment introduced by production risk and borrowing constraints. This economy displays overaccumulation of capital under a wide range of plausible parameterizations. The strong overaccumulation result is due to the interaction of uninsurable risks and credit market frictions, which generate a strong precautionary savings effect. I have also shown that combining models with entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial uninsurable risks lowers the net return to capital substantially more. On the one hand, this implies that the distortions found in Bewley-type economies are exacerbated. On the other hand, the decrease in the interest rate has potentially large implications for the welfare of workers in models with incomplete markets.
Given the importance of credit market frictions on the results of this study, other types of financial contracts should be explored that mimic more closely the contracts offered by financial intermediaries. An interesting feature of the data that is abstracted in most studies is the possibility of defaults arising in equilibrium. This is important, because the possibility of default increases risk-sharing as long as filing for bankruptcy allows entrepreneurs to keep a fraction of their assets together with current and future earnings. Thus, extending the current model along the lines of Chatterjee et al. (2002) would be a fruitful avenue of research. Meh and Terajima (2005) take interesting steps in this direction.
An important limitation of my analysis is the absence of aggregate risk. It would be interesting to extend the entrepreneurial economy along the lines of den Haan (1996; 1997) and Krusell and Smith (1997) , to measure the size of the precautionary savings effect in this environment and link it to business cycles fluctuations. That is left for future research.
Appendix: Numerical Methods
In this appendix, I describe the numerical procedures used to compute equilibrium in the entrepreneurial economy. This can be done in two steps. In the first step, the numerical procedure solves the individual's problem taking the interest rate as given. In the second step, the equilibrium interest rate is determined.
The algorithm can be started by guessing bounds on the interest rate, r; that is, by assuming that the equilibrium interest rate lies in the interval [r l , r u ]. Given this interval, let the equilibrium interest rate equal 1 2 [r l + r u ] and solve the entrepreneur's problem, for example, using Coleman's (1990) algorithm, which consists in solving for a fixed point in the consumption function. The policy function c(z, x) is approximated with a piecewise linear interpolant of the state variable, x. This variable is discretized in non-uniformly spaced grid points. In particular, there are more grid points to lower values of wealth, because there is more curvature in the consumption function owing to the presence of borrowing constraints. The productivity process, z, is assumed to follow a Markov chain with E(z) = 1, and the probability of transiting from state i to state j is given by π i,j , i, j = 1, . . . , n z . The discretization of the exogenous stochastic process follows the numerical method proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991) .
Given an initial guess, c 0 , use expressions (4), (7), and (8) with λ = 0 to find (c 1 , k 1 , b 1 ) at each grid point.
After computing the solution at each grid point, check whether the choice of bond holdings violates the shortsales constraint. In cases where the short-sales constraint is violated-that is, b 1 < b-let b 1 = b and use (4) and (8) to determine (c 1 , k 1 ) at those grid points. Use c 1 as the new initial guess and iterate on this procedure until sup | ln c 1 − ln c 0 | over all grid points is less than some convergence parameter, = 0.0000001.
After obtaining the decision rule c(z, x), it is necessary to compute the mean bond holdings E(b ) in order to check whether the interest rate clears the bond market. One easy way to evaluate this expectation is to generate a long time series for bond holdings and approximate it with its sample average. Before simulating this time series, solve for the equilibrium (c, k , b ) in a fine set of grid points for x at each productivity state, to speed-up the simulation step. Then generate a long time series of the exogenous productivity state conditional on the initial state, z 0 . Given an initial wealth level, x 0 , generate a time series for consumption and capital using piecewise linear interpolants, and use expression (4) to find the time series of bondholdings. The size of the simulation is 10,000 and the first 1,000 observations are discarded. Finally, compute the sample average of bondholdings. If it is negative, then set r l = r and repeat the above steps. Otherwise, set r u = r and repeat until |E(b )| < .
